## Politics

The Syria authorization will pass but it will be a tough fight - capital is key to GOP support

Cohen, 9/3/13 (Tom, “Syria war resolution faces tough challenge in Congress” CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/obama-syria-congress/>)

To Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution, support from the House is the biggest challenge for Obama. "There are very few moderates that are left and it's a highly polarized institution," he noted, adding that what amounts to a war authorization vote was likely to shake up the normal partisan line in Congress. "You could have libertarian Republicans joining liberal Democrats to vote no, just because they're tired of foreign adventures," West said. "It may come down to Republicans who support a strong foreign policy joining forces with Democratic moderates to give approval." A new ABC News/Washington Post poll released Tuesday showed that nearly six in 10 Americans oppose military strikes against Syria, with similar results from respondents identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans. The administration has launched what it calls a "flood the zone" lobbying effort to persuade legislators to support the resolution authorizing military strikes against Syria. This effort in Washington includes classified briefings, testimony of Cabinet members at committee hearings, and meetings with the president. Mindful of concerns that a strike on Syria will lead to a prolonged engagement, Obama said Tuesday that "this is not Iraq, and this is not Afghanistan." "This is a limited, proportional step that will send a clear message -- not only to the Assad regime, but also to other countries that may be interested in testing some of these international norms -- that there are consequences," the president said. At the hearing by the Senate panel he used to chair, Secretary of State John Kerry later said that "neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence." However, Obama departs on Tuesday night on a four-day trip to Sweden and Russia at a time when members of both parties clamor for him to be directly involved. With congressional elections next year, many legislators feel that the safe vote on Syria right now is to oppose the Obama resolution, CNN Chief National Correspondent John King said Tuesday. "The president has to sway and the most important people he'll meet with today are the House Republicans," King said. "He doesn't have good relationships with them, very few personal relationships with them. They don't trust him. They don't support most of his other policy initiatives." Speaking before Boehner and Cantor publicly backed Obama, King said the president needed the House GOP leadership to "lobby their own members, saying this is the right thing to do even if you don't agree with the president." Cantor's statement did just that, even taking on a popular GOP talking point that Obama had erred by previously declaring chemical weapons use a "red line" that would bring a U.S. response if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed it. "The United States' broader policy goal, as articulated by the president, is that Assad should go, and President Obama's red line is consistent with that goal and with the goal of deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction," Cantor said in the statement. "It is the type of red line virtually any American president would draw." However, Boehner's spokesman, Michael Steel, made clear that the speaker was leaving it to Obama to persuade legislators to support him. "It is the president's responsibility to make his case to the American people and their elected representatives," Steel said in a statement, adding that "all votes authorizing the use of military force are conscience votes for members, and passage will require direct, continuous engagement from the White House." Obama met Monday with two veteran Republican senators -- John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina -- who emerged to say they could support a more precise and robust strategy than the president initially outlined. In particular, McCain and Graham said Obama pledged increased military aid to opposition forces in Syria that would bolster their fight against al-Assad at the same time as U.S. military attacks expected to to involve cruise missile strikes on Syrian military command targets. After Obama met Tuesday with Boehner, Pelosi and the chairs of several national security committees in Congress, legislators from both parties said they expected the initial resolution proposed by the president to be revised to address their concerns. In particular, they said it would define the mission more narrowly and specify no "boots on the ground," which means no U.S. troops would be deployed to Syria. West noted that no matter what lobbying takes place, "there are some Republicans who will vote 'no' just because the idea came from President Obama" because "they detest everything he stands for." Moderates, meanwhile, may face the prospect of a primary challenge from the more extremist wing of their respective party if they authorize a war resolution, he said. "Anti-war sentiment remains very strong within the Democratic Party," West said, noting that grass-roots activists on the left opposed the Iraq war at the height of post 9/11 patriotic fervor. "The idea of another foreign intervention would be of great concern to those people." In the end, West said he expects Obama's resolution to win approval because "the president has laid national prestige on the line." However, a House GOP leadership aide told CNN that "it is going to be a big lift to get this done." "We're only going to be able to help the president as much as he's willing to help himself," the aide said on condition of not being identified, noting Obama must be personally involved, make the case for military action and "prove that we have a military plan that will work and not drag us into the mud for a long time."

Plan decreases PC

LeoGrande, 12

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The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

Capital is finite and Syria requires all of it – the plan burns his leverage and consumes docket time and energy

Brown, 9/4/13 (Carrie, Politico, “Obama's capital spreads thin”

<http://m.politico.com/iphone/story/0913/96306.html>)

President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. “The only effect is — and I don’t mean this to be dismissive in any way — it will be taking up some time and there be some degree of political capital expended by all,” said Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), the Foreign Relations Committee ranking member who helped draft the Senate resolution. “At the end of the day, it’s a tough vote for anybody because the issue is trying to draft an authorization knowing that they’re going to implement it.” The West Wing says it’s too early to know how Obama’s surprise decision to seek congressional authorization will affect the rest of his agenda, but his advisers are betting that a win could usher in other domestic successes. A failed vote, however, would undoubtedly weaken him. A senior administration official said the effort could build some trust between the White House and Republicans that might ease tensions in negotiations over the budget and other issues. White House aides have long argued that success begets success. Their latest test of that theory was the broad bipartisan Senate vote for comprehensive immigration reform bill, which was supposed to compel the House to act. So far, it has not — and House Republicans don’t think the Syria vote will be any different. “The idea that passing the authorization for use of military force in Syria would give the administration more leverage in future political debates is absurd,” one senior GOP leadership aide said. “They are currently spending political capital they don’t have.” No matter how it plays out, the sudden emergence of a fight over Syria presents both political and logistical challenges for Congress and the White House. House Republicans were already grumbling about the prospect of several perilous votes this fall — first on raising the debt limit and extending government funding, then on a package of reforms to the immigration system. White House aides began hearing skepticism from Republican leaders that they could force a debt limit hike through the chamber and then press for passage of even a pared-back immigration bill. Adding a vote on military intervention in Syria could create even more friction between the Obama administration and House Republicans, as lawmakers are being put in a position of potentially voting against their party leaders. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) are backing Obama, but the vast majority of the conference appears to oppose the resolution, at least at this point. And even before Syria took over the headlines, there was very little time on the congressional calendar to address those issues — as well as the confirmation of the yet-to-be-nominated Federal Reserve chairman. As much as Obama likes to say the White House and Congress should “be able to walk and chew gum at the same time,” often they cannot.

A failed Syria vote spurs global appeasement, allied prolif, nuclear use and shreds U.S. primacy

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On Saturday, when President Obama overruled his advisers, reversed his own policy and declared that he would not act against Syria until Congress has had its say, he did not—as he might have—recall Congress for that purpose. Instead, Mr. Obama said he would let the vote wait for 10 days or more. Then he promptly left the White House for the golf course. Later this week, he'll travel to Stockholm and then to St. Petersburg, Russia, for a G-20 economic summit. Mr. Obama's dwindling band of defenders insist that this decision "to seek authorization for the use of force from the American people's representatives in Congress" was a matter of principle which had escaped him in Libya in 2011, and that only occurred to him now after many days of plotting an air campaign against the Syrian government for its use of chemical weapons. Others, less charitably inclined, see in his Saturday announcement a mixture of unworthy motives—an outright panic when British Prime Minister David Cameron lost a war vote in the House of Commons; an unbecoming wish that Congress would give him an excuse for inaction; and an unworthy scheme to stick his enemies (as he understands them) in Congress with a responsibility he hopes to shirk. It is beside the point to assess these motives. Congress now has decisions to make. This is the argument that lies before them. The case against authorizing the use of force begins with an indictment of the administration's feckless policy toward Syria. Mr. Obama chose passivity two years ago when he might have tipped the balance to a then largely secular opposition. He concocted and then ignored red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons. And he has, with this latest backflip, shown himself eager to squirm out of his own commitments, even as the rhetoric of his pronouncements ("limited," "tailored," "no boots on the ground," etc.) indicates far more interest in what the U.S. will not do than what it should do, and why. The president's critics will further note, and correctly, that war is war, and, as such, unpredictable. As Winston Churchill put it: "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." Despite Mr. Obama's statements about narrowly defined goals, precise uses of force and limited duration, it is entirely reasonable to expect that such a strange voyage may lie ahead once operations begin, and that he is singularly ill-fitted to navigate it. Finally, as a practical matter, critics can ask why the U.S. should intervene after a massacre, however hideous, of some 1,400 Syrians, when America has refused to act over the slaughter of 100,000 in the preceding two years. And, even if the U.S. strikes at Assad and helps bring about his downfall, the danger is real that having administered a defeat to the regime and its sponsor, Iran, America will hand a victory to al Qaeda. These are all serious arguments. But weightier are the counterarguments. For better or for worse, the credibility not only of this president, but of America as a global power and a guarantor of international order, is on the line. If the U.S.—after its president said two years ago that Assad must go and then, a year later, drew a red line at Syria's use of chemical weapons—now does nothing, profound conclusions will be drawn by a China ready to bully its neighbors, by a North Korea whose scruples are already minimal, and by an Iran that has already killed many Americans in a covert war waged against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. America's friends will realize that its word means nothing. As a result, they will either abandon us, or arm themselves with nuclear weapons. And these countries will be increasingly willing to wield them in a world in which they have no great ally who may be counted upon to stand by them in an hour of need. One has to suspect that the Syrian government deliberately used sarin in the Damascus suburbs while United Nations inspectors were in the capital, and on the eve of the anniversary of Mr. Obama's red line statement. The essence of tyranny is this message to a population: "We will impose our will on you. No one cares about your suffering, and no one will do anything to rescue you." Assad's message was delivered by chemical weapons of mass destruction. Civilized nations let that message remain unanswered at their peril. The U.S. now faces a twofold problem. The first is that many Americans who came of age in the past 25 years, having grown up in a world that has been shaped by U.S. primacy, take that primacy and the stability and prosperity it has brought for granted. They should not. It hangs in the balance.

Extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” The World Politics Review, March 7, 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, and a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

## Oil DA

Russian oil prices at an all-time high

Soldatkin 7/29 – Vladimir, writer for Reuters. (“http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/russia-oil-domestic-idUSL6N0FZ22G20130729”, “Russia domestic crude rally surges on, prices at record high”, Reuters, 7/29/13, MCallahan

MOSCOW, July 29 (Reuters) - Domestic crude oil prices in Russia, the world's top producer, surged by over 14 percent to an all-time high last week due to cuts in volumes usually supplied to the spot market by TNK-BP, acquired by Rosneft, and higher international oil prices, traders said. The spot market, with capacity of around 3.5 million tonnes (25.7 million barrels) of crude per month - almost a fifth of all oil consumed in Russia - first felt the shock of the $55 billion TNK-BP buyout in June, when prices surged almost 25 percent. Crude in the domestic spot market is bought mostly by refineries which do not have any, or enough, production of their own. Traders said the quotes for spot delivery in August on the Russian market reached an all-time high after some previous non-binding supply agreements with TNK-BP were scrapped and Rosneft's offers, which traditionally make up a third of the total volume on the market, dried up. The companies are not obliged to supply volumes to the spot market but they sell some barrels domestically, on top of their long-term agreements. The shortages on the domestic spot market and in Europe have started to appear as Rosneft started to boost oil flows to China after securing a $270 billion deal earlier this year to more than double the supplies. Rosneft declined immediate comments on its strategy to supply the domestic oil market. The rise followed an increase in the price of Brent, which last week traded in the range of $106.5-$108.5 per barrel, up from $99.7-103.4 a month earlier. An expected increase in the export duty next month also underpinned the rally. Prices for delivery in August at West Siberian metering points jumped to 14,050 - 14,500 roubles ($430-$440) per tonne from 12,500 - 13,100 roubles in July. This is more than the exporting netback via Baltic Sea port Primorsk - the price excluding transportation costs and export duty - for Urals of 13,150-13,700 roubles, according to Reuters calculations. Higher domestic prices may have contributed to thin Russian export volumes, which in turn supported the prices of Russia's Urals blend on international markets. REFINERIES HIT HARD The rising prices have wiped out refining margins for local plants, which were forced to pay a premium of up to 1,000 roubles per tonne to the exporting netback and scale back production volumes. According to the latest figures from Russia's Energy Ministry, small refineries cut production by 10.5 percent to 958,000 tonnes in June. That bucked last year's trend, when the independent refineries boosted output by 13.5 percent to 12.5 million tonnes (250,000 barrels per day). "Production volumes have been decreasing across the whole country due to uncertainty over resources," a source at a refinery said.

Plan instigates oil trade

Telegraph ’11 - (“US could lift Cuba embargo after oil discovery”, Telegraph, 5/29/2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/8544870/US-could-lift-Cuba-embargo-after-oil-discovery.html, JKahn)

The five decade-long United States embargo against Cuba could finally be lifted after the discovery of an enormous oil field in Cuban waters. The world's longest-running embargo has endured in part because there was little the US wanted to buy from its impoverished neighbour. But the discovery of between five and 20 billion barrels of oil in the deep waters off Cuba's north coast, only 60 miles away from Florida, has made American businessmen and politicians consider lifting the embargo. Repsol, the Spanish oil firm, will start exploratory drilling within months. If it strikes a large deposit, the trade embargo could be significantly revised or removed, according to Professor Mark Jones, an expert on Latin America at the Rice University of Texas. "The greater the drilling and production, the greater the pressure will be to engage in a complete overhaul of the trade embargo, either getting rid of it altogether or watering it down substantially," he said. "I think it is fairly realistic, since the embargo is an anachronism of the Cold War sustained only by a misguided fear of a backlash from anti-Castro Cuban Americans." Opponents of the US embargo argue that it has failed to drive Fidel and Raul Castro from power and that if Cuba becomes rich from its oil, regime change is even less likely. They also argue that warmer relations between the two countries could help stave off an environmental crisis if there is a spill from the field. Jorge Pinon, visiting research fellow with Florida International University's Cuban Research Insitute, warned: "The US embargo means Repsol can't pick up the phone to Washington. Any equipment to help in a problem would have to come from the UK or Norway or somewhere else." Repsol will drill at least one and possibly as many as five wells in waters of similar depth to those where an explosion on BP's Deepwater Horizon rig caused eleven deaths and led to an environmental catastrophe. In the event of a further disaster, as much as 90 per cent of any spill could end up in US waters. "If there is any leverage that could push the Obama administration or the US Congress to push for change it would be from an environmental standpoint." said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser at the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. He argued the US could treat Cuban oil in the same way it treats oil from Venezuela: "We don't like them but we like their product and we are going to buy it". The current embargo expires this September. However, Prof Jones suggested that it is unlikely that Barack Obama will move to lift it w the conclusion of his next run for President.

A surge in world oil production will destroy Russia’s economy

Duffy ‘13, (staff writer), Aimee Apr. 20, 2013. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2013 from http://www.fool.com/investing /general/2013/04/20/cheap-oil-may-be-here-before-you-know-it.aspx

The problem is that isn't quite how it works. Russia, for one, has always been dependent on oil prices. In fact, it was the collapse of oil prices in the late '80s that ended up being the straw that broke the USSR's back. As Tyler Priest wrote in the Journal of American History last June:¶ The oil price collapse also played a lead role in ending the Cold War. It undermined the economy of the Soviet Union, which had quietly become the world's largest oil pro­ducer, dependent on oil export revenues to pay for imported manufactured goods from the West and to support the economies of East European satellites. Plummeting crude prices cost the Soviet Union an alarming $20 billion per year, causing panic in the Polit­buro.¶ Right there you've got the world leader in oil production combined with the necessity of high oil prices, and all that comes of it is a price collapse -- a collapse caused, I might add, by a surge in world production and OPEC's inability to stick to its quota system. The price of oil was halved in one year, falling to $14 in 1986.

Low Russian economy risks nuclear war

Speice, 2006 (staff, William and Mary Law Review), Patrick F. February 1, 2006. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2013 from Lexis.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

Cuba has huge oil reserves.

Tim Padgett, 2008 (staff writer, TIME, Oct. 23, 2008. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html>, Accessed 7/19/2013, rwg)

If true, those potential reserves could make Cuba a major petro player in the hemisphere. (The U.S. has reserves of 29 billion bbl.) And it could render the embargo an even more ineffective means of dislodging the aging Castro brothers, Fidel and current President Raúl. "If it really is 20 billion, then it's a game changer," says Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, a Cuba oil analyst at the University of Nebraska-Omaha. "It provides a lot more justification for changing elements of the embargo, just as we did when we allowed agricultural and medical sales to Cuba" a decade ago.

## CP

Text: Using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should exempt transactions involving academic exchanges from enforcement under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

First, the counterplan solves via specific exemptions — OFAC has broad discretion over sanctions enforcement.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage

Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program broadly, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of unintended targets, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no influence in their sanctioned government. n347 The broad reach of U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international support for the sanctions programs, and even undermine the policy objectives of the programs. n348 One way in which OFAC mitigates [\*792] the collateral damage of its holistic sanctions is by issuing licenses that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies n349 and provide humanitarian aid n350 to people in sanctioned countries. In an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also allow certain activities from an otherwise sanctioned country. n351 Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. n352 By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof, to the extent possible, on those in a position to produce the desired change, rather than on innocent civilians and businesses. n353

Second, the counterplan solves quickly and without political fallout — it doesn’t require legislative or regulatory action.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

3. Adaptability

The third core competency of OFAC's licensing practices is the ability to adapt a particular sanctions program quickly in response to political or circumstantial changes. n388 In situations where sanctions goals can change with the tides of revolution, the slow march of legislative and rulemaking processes may be incapable of producing a timely response. Sanctions targeting government-owned or government-operated entities may need to be lifted in response to a positive regime change or re-imposed in the event that the new government fails. n389 OFAC often utilizes general licenses to manage these fast-paced scenarios, either by easing sanctions through license adoption or strengthening sanctions through license revocation. n390 By issuing or revoking general licenses, OFAC can react to the changing political circumstances of a targeted country without requiring a regulatory overhaul or the signing or withdrawal of an executive order. n391

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The aff’s rejection of chaos constructs an unreal perfect world opposite reality that they order themselves to – this engenders ressentiment. They blame the chaos that is a part of them on their neighbor, and try to eradicate it.

Saurette ‘96, - Paul Saurette has a PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

Risk is inherent – their fear of life robs them of everything worth living for. This creates a negative Will to Power which rejects the “bad” parts of life.  
Der Derian ‘93 - James, professor of political science at the U Massachusetts-Amherst and prof of IR at Brown 93, "The political subject of violence" ed. David Campbell and Michael Dillon, p 101-105

Nietzsche and Interpretive Realism In the last analysis, "love of the neighbor" is always something secondary, partly conventional and arbitrary—illusory in relation to fear of the neigh-bor. After the structure of society is fixed on the whole and seems secure against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbor that again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. —Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbcss and Marx's interpretations of securi-ty through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fiaional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future.33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterprctation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results."34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings—including self-preservation—are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages."35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war.” But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a con-sensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference—that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks of the reader "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubi lation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restora-tion of a sense of security?\*\*37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative pro-duces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols-. The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?\*1 shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause—a cause (hat is comforting, liber-ating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but tor a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation—that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations.38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility—recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences."39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god."40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error, in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something 10 be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its »4l causes. Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Gencalo gy of Morals, Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to ones ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplish-ments of the ancestors that the tribe exists—and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their contin-ued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength/2 Sacrifices, honors, obedience arc given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribts are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god.4i As the ancestors debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that pan of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they sec in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then: by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative—and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it—have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousncss, and docs so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security. Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation."46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox—all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues—How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic clement of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead tor mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearrulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fiarsomeness, not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of Utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of securi iv. In The Genealogy of Morals^ he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhatbymia"—a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.

Our alternative is to “Do nothing in the instance of the plan.” The refusal to act accepts the inevitability of struggle, allowing us to understand pain positively.

Nietzsche, ‘78 The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878

The means to real peace.— No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all cuntries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.